Miller's Pentecost

Greg Mogenson

During the course of a seminar given in 1925, the Swiss psychologist, C.G. Jung drew upon an important image from Christian symbolism to make an equally important point about the analytic experience that his approach to psychology had been conceived to foster. "Analysis," he evocatively declared, "should release an experience that grips us or falls upon us as from above, an experience that has substance and body such as those things [that] occurred to the ancients. If I were going to symbolize it I would choose the Annunciation."¹

Appearing to the virgin, Mary, prior to her marriage to Joseph, the angel Gabriel announced to her that she was to be made pregnant with the Son of God by the power of the Holy Ghost. Incredulous as to how this could be so, given that she had not had relations with any man, Mary was greatly troubled by what she had been told. But the angel assured her; she had found favour with God and was to have no fear. Faithfully accepting her fate, the virgin replied, "I am the handmaid of the Lord: let it happen to me according to your word" (Luke 1:38).

With his reference to this event, Jung beautifully conveys the revelatory quality of the encounter with the self's alterity which he believed that analysis should facilitate. Patients in analysis, he clearly implies, should be introduced to an attitude that is as receptive to the otherness of the ways in which they happen to themselves as was the Mary of the Annunciation story to the Angel of the Lord.

A question arises. Setting aside Jung's focus upon patients and their experience in analysis, let us ask: can Jung's analogy to the Annunciation be applied as well to the "therapy of ideas"?²

The phrase, "therapy of ideas," of course, comes from the honouree of this festschrift, David Miller. We find it in the introductions to his books and articles. In these works it is most often
Christian ideas, and especially theological ones, that are taken up in this spirit. As Miller explains, "Both doctrinal and pietistic theologizing tend to deny or defend against the depths of religious meaning, its fundamental mystery and ambiguity, its terror and grace, its autonomous nature that comes and goes as it will, like the Holy Ghost wandering over the face of the deep. Ego theology is a defense mechanism which banalizes religion."³

These words of Miller's, taken together with his call for a therapy of ideas, immediately bring G. K. Chesterton and Søren Kierkegaard to mind. In a passage of his book, *Orthodoxy*, Chesterton famously described the modern world as being full of Christian ideas gone mad.⁴ And in his iconoclastic book, "Attack Upon Christendom," Kierkegaard compared the state of Christianity in his day to that of a hospital in which patients are dying, not from this germ or that practice, but from the building itself! With this analogy Kierkegaard implies that the whole structure and framework of the Church has gone awry.⁵

Miller's critical remarks with respect to doctrinal and pietistic theology having short-changed the depths of religious meaning are reminiscent of another passage from Jung's writings. In this passage the psychologist also speaks about a resistant theological mentality on the one hand and of the Holy Ghost or Spirit moving upon the face of the deeps on the other.

A theologian who had come to Jung for treatment dreamt that he was looking down from a slope over a low valley. The valley was dense with woods and in the middle of these was a lake. Feeling that he had previously been prevented from going there, the dreamer was now determined to descend into the valley and to approach the lake. As he did so, however, the atmosphere became uncanny. All of a sudden a gust of wind passed across the lake's surface causing it to ripple ominously. Overwhelmed, the dreamer awoke in terror. Commenting upon the dream Jung acknowledges that "at first this dream seems incomprehensible."
But as a theologian the dreamer should have remembered the "pool" whose waters were stirred by a sudden wind, and in which the sick were bathed--the pool of Bethesda. An angel descended and touched the water, which thereby acquired curative powers. The light wind is the pneuma which bloweth where it listeth. And that terrified the dreamer. An unseen presence is suggested, a numen that lives its own life and in whose presence man shudders. The dreamer was reluctant to accept the association with the pool of Bethesda. He wanted nothing of it, for such things are met with only in the Bible, or at most on Sunday mornings as the subjects of sermons, and have nothing to do with psychology. All very well to speak of the Holy Ghost on occasions--but it is not a phenomenon to be experienced!6

Miller's therapy of ideas, indeed his entire oeuvre, can be understood as the working-through of the religious resistances that figure in this theologian's dream. Working "depth theologically" and "theopoetically" Miller demonstrates the life and autonomy of the spirit by means of a wide ranging scholarship that takes in the pagan gods that preceded Christianity, on the one hand, and the seemingly (but in fact quite otherwise) secular poetry that now follows, on the other. The upshot of this is that quite apart from the liveliness that Miller brings to his writings (or perhaps interpenetrating with this as a diviner nature through his own), there is something that moves of itself through his many sources. Placed alongside one another the voices he cites become tongues of fire. And just as Pentecost was called a second annunciation because with it the Church was born, so the pentecost of Miller's richly allusive depth theology brings about a third in which what he has referred to as "theology's ego" gives way or becomes transparent to "religion's soul."7
Clearly, as Miller’s work bears witness, the therapy of ideas can come upon us like the Annunciation.8

But now we are faced with another question. This question has to do with Miller’s having described his work as an attempt to be responsive to Jung’s statement, “We must gratefully acknowledge the invaluable support psychology has received from students of ... religion, even if they on their part have not yet learnt how to make use of its insights.”9 Doubtless, this description is very true. Having drawn deeply upon the insights of Freud, Jung, Hillman and Lacan, Miller certainly has made good the lack that Jung points out, offering a compelling and therapeutic analysis of the defensive theologizing of the religion (as he puts it) that religion itself should be against.10 But—and here is my question—can an approach to the study of religion that has fully integrated the insights of depth psychology bring its therapy of ideas to bear upon the interpretation of psychology? While depth psychology has certainly contributed much to religion in exposing “the religion of false piety, the religion used as human wish- or need-fulfilment, a crutch and opiate, the religion of spiritual pride ...,”11 must it not apply this same analysis to its own ideas if it is not to be guilty of calling the kettle black? Lacan said that if religion triumphs psychoanalysis is finished.12 But, by the same token, is not psychoanalysis finished if, like some freed Barabbas, it settles beneath the niveau that religion has long since reached?

The Christian scriptures state that the Holy Ghost will not “leave [it]self without witness” (Acts 14:17).13 Miller’s dialectical reading of depth psychology as postmodern theology allows us to reflect upon psychology in the light of this assurance. Deeply comprehended, and at its most soulful, psychology itself is the form that this witness has taken in our day, as Jung expressly indicates with his comparison of the analytic experience to the Annunciation and with his interpretation of his theologian patient’s dream.
Many associations could be cited to support this claim. Reading psychoanalysis through the lens of the Christian motifs that are continued in its theories, we find that a whole host of analogies further to Jung's analogy to the Annunciation can be drawn. I will only give the merest hint of these by reminding the reader of the talking cure's virginal conception in the womb of the hysterically pregnant Anna O., Dora's account in her analysis with Freud of having sat transfixed before the painting of the Sistine Madonna in the Dresden gallery, and Lacan's teaching having been celebrated by his devotees as having "reproduced the annunciation scene with Lacan playing all the parts. Sometimes he was the space that welcomes the word; sometimes, as Christ born of the Virgin, he transmitted it; something, as man-God, he sowed it in others."\(^{15}\)

Jung, of course, was well aware that psychology is redolent of the motifs of religion and myth, its theories being the expression of archetypes common to all three.\(^{16}\) The comparative youth of the discipline he even attributed to religion having previously provided a formulation for everything psychic, one that both presaged and forestalled psychology's appearance as such.\(^{17}\) Given this, it is all the more interesting to read psychology for the witness it provides for what the religion preceding it had called the Holy Ghost or Spirit. The passage from Jung's writings that comes most readily to my mind in this connection is one in which psychology's witness is presented negatively, i.e., in the form of a warning.

Not for a moment dare we succumb to the illusion that an archetype can be finally explained and disposed of. Even the best attempts at explanation are only more or less successful translations into another metaphorical language .... The most we can do is to *dream the myth onwards* and give it a modern dress. And whatever explanation or interpretation does to it, we do to our own souls as well, with
corresponding results for our own well-being. The archetype--let us never forget this--is a psychic organ present in all of us. A bad explanation means a correspondingly bad attitude to this organ, which may thus be injured. But the ultimate sufferer is the bad interpreter himself. Hence the "explanation" should always be such that the functional significance of the archetype remains unimpaired, so that an adequate and meaningful connection between the conscious mind and the archetype is assured. For the archetype is an element of our psychic structure and thus a vital and necessary component in our psychic economy. It represents or personifies certain instinctive data of the dark, primitive psyche, the real but invisible roots of consciousness. Of what elementary importance the connection with these roots is, we see from the preoccupation of the primitive mentality with certain "magic" factors, which are nothing less than what we would call archetypes. This original form of religio ("linking back") is the essence, the working basis of all religious life even today, and always will be, whatever future form this life may take.18

Significantly, this warning of Jung’s regarding the critical importance of psychology's attitude with respect to the archetype is resonant with Christ's warning with respect to the sin against the Holy Ghost as this is given in the gospels. We could even say, drawing upon the language used by Jung in the last line of the passage from which we have just quoted, that, "as a more or less successful translation into another metaphorical language," it may even be the "future form" that this warning now takes.
Wherefore I say unto you, all manner of sin and blasphemy shall be forgiven unto
men; but the blasphemy against the Holy Ghost shall not be forgiven unto men. ...
Whosoever speakest against the Holy Ghost, it shall not be forgiven him, neither in
this world, neither in the world to come. 19

It is an irony, given what we have had to say with respect to its spiritual charter, that
psychology is so often guilty of the commission of this sin of which Christ speaks. Indeed, it could
even be said that against itself psychology everywhere exists as the contemporary form of the
unforgivable blasphemy. The most blatant and pernicious example of this comes from the pen of
Ernest Jones. In two early papers, "The Madonna's Conception through the Ear" 20 and "A Psycho-
Analytic Study of the Holy Ghost Concept," 21 Jones analyzes the Annunciation to Mary and the
Holy Ghost idea in terms of Freudian categories. The result of this is as astonishing as it is
perverse. Squeezed into an Oedipal framework that calculates in terms of erogenous zones and
childhood sexual theories, the fructifying, pneumatic character of the angel's greeting in the
Annunciation scene is interpretively reduced to the intestinal gas which the child's polymorphously
perverse mind conceives of as having been emitted from the bowel of its omnipotently deposed
father even as the ear of the Virgin that had received the greeting is interpreted to be not an ear at
all, but rather the lowly maternal anus into which Everyman's emasculated Joseph farts! 22 Hardly a
scene for a stained glass window!

Now it is important to understand that Jones's blasphemy against the Holy Ghost does not
reside in his having chosen to analyze the Annunciation story and Holy Ghost concept. As we
discussed earlier, these can be discussed in psychology in a manner that continues to bear them
witness, even if by other, no longer sacred, names. Rather, it is in the absolute reductiveness of his
approach that Jones's blasphemy lies. And this would be so regardless of what his subject matter happened to be or what he chose to reduce this to. The mystery of virginal conception and of the life of the spirit that comes and goes of its own accord is just as effaced when the tertium comparationis is some other fundamental such as child development, the letter in the unconscious, or transference derivatives of the bi-personal field. For while it is true (as we now say, contra Bishop Butler\textsuperscript{23}) that nothing is what it is (i.e., identical with itself), no thing can be truly accounted for as being ‘really’ some other thing, either.

The reference I have just made to the bi-personal field will remind long-time readers of archetypal psychology of the controversial discussion that took place some twenty years ago now in the pages of *Spring Journal*.\textsuperscript{24} At issue in that theology-like debate was the status of the psyche as an independent, autonomous reality. James Hillman began this discussion by dialoguing with Paul Kugler about an article that the Jungian analyst William Goodheart had published in the *Journal of Analytical Psychology*.\textsuperscript{25} Hillman, as he put it, was "enraged" by this article, which he regarded as "a prolonged attack on basic ideas in Jung's doctoral dissertation."\textsuperscript{26} Wishing to understand his reaction better, he discussed Goodheart's article with Kugler and then sought the comments of ten colleagues on their exchange.

It is not necessary here to recapitulate the whole of this fascinating discussion. The main thing to grasp is that in Hillman's view (though he does not put it quite this way himself) the reduction of the soul's life to the bi-personal field (a concept that regards psychic phenomena to be the product of transference\textbackslash countertransference exchanges of the patient and analyst in the consulting room) is tantamount to the unforgivable blasphemy against that witness to the Holy Spirit that the concept of the autonomous psyche may be taken to be in our time. "What is centrally at stake," Hillman passionately declares, "... is the idea, and my faith in it, of the autonomous
psyche, the self-moving, self-forming activity of the soul."\(^{27}\)

Speaking with a cooler head Kugler summarizes:

Goodheart asserts that Jung's theoretical concept of the "autonomous psyche" was a reaction-formation derived from the bi-personal field, designed to defend against acknowledging unconscious erotic feelings for Helly [Jung's medium cousin who was the subject of his doctoral dissertation]. This assertion raises important ontological issues. What ontological status is being granted to the "bi-personal field" and to the "autonomous psyche"? For Goodheart, the bi-personal field receives primary ontological status, while the autonomous psyche is viewed as secondary and derivative.\(^{28}\)

Now it is important to understand that the controversy here is not about the bi-personal field per se. Without a doubt this concept pays tribute to an important phenomenon, as Goodheart clearly demonstrates in his masterful reply.\(^{29}\) At issue, rather, is the reduction of the autonomous psyche to the bi-personal field (or to any more literal reality for that matter) such that it is viewed as "secondary and derivative." As Kugler goes on to explain, by "primary ontological status" he means our "most fundamental fantasy of ‘what is real’.\(^{30}\) To deny this status to the psyche (that animating source of our reality sense\(^{31}\)) in favour of the dialectical materialism of bi-personal field dynamics is a gesture than can be likened to the one that Jung criticises as "deny[ing] the great and blam[ing] the petty,"\(^{32}\) or so Hillman, Kugler, and several of the commentators here insist.

In his comment on the Hillman-Kugler exchange, Wolfgang Giegerich, that most trenchant therapist of ideas, convincingly argues that the autonomous psyche, far from being an idea that
psychology can freely adopt or reject, is, rather, "the indispensable prerequisite for doing psychology at all." In making this point, Giegerich draws an analogy to mathematical physics. While we usually attribute the fact that physics has developed into an exact science to its empirical methodology and its application of mathematics to the natural world, these are secondary, Giegerich maintains, to its fundamental gesture which has been its "unconditional surrender to its underlying pre-conception of the world ...."

With absolute commitment, physics followed the principle that "nature" has to be explained exclusively from "natural" causes. At no point was science allowed to take recourse in any factor outside of its own vision. It had to fall back on its own resources, and ruthlessly to rid itself of ideas extraneous to its fantasy as Fate, Spirit, God, Ether—not because these are theological or mythical ideas whereas physics' "nature" was not but simply to be true to its own myth. It is as if physics had, with respect to its root fantasy, strictly obeyed Jung's advice concerning fantasy images in general, "Above all, don't let anything from outside, that does not belong, get into it, for the fantasy-image has 'everything it needs'."

Read in the light of our previous discussion, Giegerich could here be said to have described the annunciation scene through which physics virginally conceived and gave birth to itself. For the science of physics to be conceived, "nature," like Mary, had to be approached without recourse to any external fathering factor. Its cause had to be found tautologically, parthenogenetically, within itself as its own archai. Nothing from outside could be allowed to get in. Nothing more fundamental than its own conception of itself could be appealed to for explanation. For to make
such an appeal would have been to have precisely the wrong attitude that Jung warned against above.

Carrying forward into psychology the Annunciation-to-Mary-like action that has been at work in the conception of physics and the other sciences, Giegerich avers that

In order for psychology to be, it must posit an autonomous psyche, because only then is psychological inquiry possible in the first place. For only if the psyche is granted autonomy and spontaneity does psychology relentlessly bind itself to the unknownness of its own root fantasy, having to explain everything psychic "tautologically" from the psyche herself, and only if psychology strictly refuses to base itself on anything outside the idea of "psyche" (whatever "psyche" may be\textsuperscript{35}) will it be inescapably forced into the depth of its subject matter and be able to establish its own (psychological) version of exactitude and certainty.\textsuperscript{36}

With these reflections in mind, let us now briefly re-examine the passage from Jung that was cited above in which he raises his warning with respect to the attitude to the archetype and then, by way of conclusion, indicate something of Miller's contribution to this issue.

In the Jung passage, immediately prior to the warning that is given, psychological explanations are characterized as "more or less successful translations into another metaphorical language." Reiterating this point, Jung speaks of "dream[ing] the myth onwards" and of "giv[ing] it a modern dress." With these phrases the reflexive, psychology-constituting insight that psychological theory is itself an expression of the autonomous life of the psyche is well conveyed while in the same breath continuing witness is given to Holy Ghost or Spirit, albeit by other names.
But what about the unforgivable sin? If we grant that Jung's cautionary remarks concerning the attitude of the interpreter to the archetype is itself archetypally akin to Christ's warning with respect to the blasphemy against the Holy Ghost, the question remains as to whether Jung's statement is up to the level already attained by the religion that it has so frequently looked to as its other, the myth that it dreams onwards.

When considered in the light of the autonomous psyche discussion of Hillman, Kugler, Goodheart, Giegerich *et al.*, it is evident that while Jung rightly speaks about the critical importance of the interpreter's attitude, his reifying reference to "the archetype," his positivizing reference to this as "an organ in us," and his dissociatively thinking in terms of a subject *here* and objectified archetype *there* contradict the attitude he wishes to recommend. The problem here is very much like the one that Jung discusses with respect to his religious critics. Railing against those theologians who would accuse him of psychologism for speaking of God in psychological terms, Jung writes, "... the theologian is used to giving orders to God, he tells him how he should behave. He has got him in writing, and he says: You are not God any longer if you do not behave as you did two thousand years ago. He has taken God's freedom away from him." Now, it is precisely this taking of freedom away from what he calls the archetype that Jung would see as example of the wrong attitude. But closely examining the way in which Jung has the archetype in writing, we see that his manner of speaking often treats it as an entity or thing. True, Jung does stress what he calls "the indefiniteness of the archetype" even as he is quick to correct "the mistaken notion that an archetype is determined in regard to its content ...." Ironically, however, with the familiarity of repeated usage the word itself becomes the "nothing but" from which Jung wished to free it. Speaking just as reductively as ever Freud did of sex, Jungian discourse frequently refers to the archetype of *this* and the archetype of *that*. From this we can see that the logic of Jungian thought,
while claiming to be against reductive thinking, itself reductively appeals to the archetypes as something behind the phenomena with which reflection is concerned. Following from this, symbols become the signs that Jung contrasted them to when defining what he meant by symbol.\textsuperscript{41} While still said to be approximations of the unknown, they are logically reduced to the known.

Keenly appreciative of the tensions between contemporary critical theory, apophatic theology, and Jung's thought, Miller's therapy of ideas has frequently ministered to this problematic. With respect to the archetype concept, for example, Miller could be said to have done for this God-term of Jung's something similar to what negative theology has done for the notion of God.

A passage from the theologian Paul Tillich may serve to make this issue clearer. Releasing religious reflection from the wrong kind of questioning (even as Jung would release psychological reflection from the wrong attitude), Tillich notes that "a God about whose existence or non-existence you can argue is [only] a thing beside others in a universe of existing things."\textsuperscript{42} Following upon this Tillich then refers to science. While reading what he has to say about this, let us bear in mind Jung's irritable insistence with respect to his identity as a scientist. "It is regrettable," Tillich continues, "that scientists believe that they have refuted religion when they rightly have shown that there is no evidence whatsoever for the assumption that such a being exists. Actually they have not refuted religion, but they have done it a considerable service. They have forced it to reconsider and to restate the meaning of the tremendous word God."\textsuperscript{43} The point Tillich is making is that God is not an existing \textit{being} or \textit{thing}, not even the highest being, but the dimension of consciousness, depth, and concern in which all things have their presence. Now, it is true that Jung thought that his science, far from refuting religion, served it. This, certainly, is the prevailing view of his work. But here it must be understood that as a positive scientist Jung's support of religion can be likened to that of those in theology who, in Tillich's view, are "more dangerous for religion than the so-called
atheistic scientists" due to their positivistic "assertion that there is a higher being called God."\textsuperscript{44}

With a moment's reflection, the distinction that Tillich draws is easily understood. Simply put, it is the very definition of God that He is not an existing being, not a positivity or thing. The complexity of this comes in when we consider the constitution of the consciousness that such a conception involves. Religious consciousness (and here I am talking, not of its animistic precursors, but of its later expressions) is a consciousness that has freed itself from following sense impressions and from thinking in terms of ontic entities and the physics of beings and things. It follows from this that to be up to the level of consciousness of the religion that has preceded it, psychology must recognize its own version of the difference discussed by Tillich. It must reflect, that is to say, in terms of what Miller and Giegerich have called the "psychological difference."\textsuperscript{45}

As cited by Miller, a passage of Jung's touches upon this issue. "If you will contemplate [your nothingness], your lack of fantasy, [lack] of inspiration, and [lack] of inner aliveness which you feel as sheer stagnation and a barren wilderness, and impregnate it with the interest born of alarm at your inner death, then something can take shape in you, for your inner emptiness conceals just as great a fullness, if you allow it to penetrate into you."\textsuperscript{46} Reading Jung in terms of the apophatic (negative-theology-like) statements that can be found across his many writings, Miller helps analytical psychology to "reconsider and restate" the meaning and non-meaning of its tremendous words--archetype, unconscious, self. We are reminded by Miller, for example, of Jung's views regarding the "impossibility of knowledge of archetypes (CW 11: 460), of 'ego' (CW 18: 10), and the 'unconscious'."\textsuperscript{47} And further to this, Miller's citations work against the idolatry that the self concept degenerates into in much of therapeutic parlance. As Jung was careful to point out to his readers, "Nothing is known regarding the self because it is a transcendental hypothesis." Miller adds,
The implication of Jung's post-Kantian observations about the epistemic status of psychological theory has important implication for therapy or, as Jung called it, "individuation," that is, the becoming of "self." The implication is that to become "self" is to become nothing, that is, no-thing, not some-thing. Where "ego" is, there let "self" be, means (since the notion of "self" does not have a definite empirical referent) let nothing be. The integration of "self" into "ego’s" life is the integration of nothingness, just like the people in religions say.48

Miller's strategy here, as a therapist of Jungian ideas, is well conveyed in a passage he quotes from Norman O. Brown: "Get the nothing back into words. The aim is words with nothing to them: words that point beyond themselves rather than to themselves, transparencies, empty words. Empty words corresponding to the void in things."49 Like Brown's empty words, concepts, too, as Miller has so cannily shown, must have nothing in them if they are to point beyond themselves, not to some signified concept or thing, but to the void of things, the airy nothing that imagination bodies forth. "We should never forget," writes Jung expressing a related insight, "that in any psychological discussion we are not saying anything about the psyche, but that the psyche is always speaking about itself."50

* * *

We began with an angel's greeting to a virgin and now speak, after having critiqued reductive interpretation, of empty words corresponding to the void in things--the Mary of the Annunciation yet again. This greeting, along with its assurance of a virginal conception, is as much psychology's as it ever was Christianity's. For as the inwardness of whatever its "Mary" may be,
psychology must also produce itself without input from some other source. Indeed, it is only in this way, as the "nothing [that] almost sees miracles," that it can truly be psychology at all. *Ave psychologia.*

Dreaming the myth onwards, it can also be said that just as the Miracle at Pentecost has been called a second Annunciation because with it the Church was born, so psychology rightly understood now constitutes a third. Explicitly making this point himself, Jung writes that "a further development of myth might well begin with the outpouring of the Holy Spirit upon the apostles, by which they were made into sons of God, and not they only, but all others who through them and after them received the *filiatio*--sonship of God--and thus partook of the certainty that they were more than autochthonous *animalia* sprung from the earth, that as twice-born they had their roots in the divinity itself."  

Surely the Jung of this passage could have no better friend and colleague than David Miller. Nor could we who honour David in this volume. Again and again, the gift of his scholarship has shown the self-movement of the spirit by means of felicitous juxtapositions of religion, myth, depth psychology and modern literature. Reading with Miller between these lines, a third expresses itself. Present only as an absence, this third (as Miller has more than once had the therapeutic task of reminding us) is not a thing. A "no-thing," as Miller often says, we give it better witness by saying what it is like than what it is. And what is it like? Among Jung's many references we have mentioned three: the angel’s announcement to Mary that she is to become the mother of God, the jubilant apostles inspired with tongues of fire, and the pool at Bethesda stirred by a sudden wind. Contemporizing this witness with literary references, Miller mentions Wallace Stevens’ likening of poetry to “a pheasant disappearing into the brush,” Harold Pinter’s quip about a “weasel under the cocktail cabinet,” D.H. Lawrence’s remarks about “this voice of my being I may never deny,” and
Joyce’s “sacred pigeon.” To this still very partial list we now may add another: Miller's Pentecost.

References


8 In his analogy to the Annunciation, Jung speaks of analysis as releasing an experience that “falls upon us as from above.” Connecting this up with our extension of the Annunciation analogy to the therapy of ideas a few further passages from Jung are apt. Jung writes, “It is true that … ideas are never the personal property of their so-called author, on the contrary, the person is the bondservant of ideas…. A person does not make ideas, we could say that a person’s ideas make the person” (CW 4 ¶ 769; cited by Miller, “Animadversions,” 27). See also Jung’s discussion of the dove as a “theriomorphic symbol … capable of ‘interpretation from above downwards’” (CW 14 ¶ 205).

9 Miller, *Three Faces of God*, 6-7. Jung citation is to CW 18 ¶ 1164.

10 Miller, "Attack Upon Christendom!," 37.

11 Miller, "Attack Upon Christendom!,” 37.

12 Cf. Miller, "Attack upon Christendom!," 32.


16 C.G. Jung, *CW* 9, i ¶ 302.

17 C.G. Jung, *CW* 9, i ¶ 11.

18 C.G. Jung, *CW* 9, i ¶ 271.


22 With reference to the conception of Christ, which was "effected by the angel's word of greeting and the breath of a dove simultaneously entering the Madonna's ear," Jones writes: “A study of Greek and Hindu physiological philosophy ... shows that breath used to have a much broader connotation, that of the so-called pneuma concept, and that an important constituent of this concept- -probably the greater part of at least its sexual aspects--were derived from another gaseous excretion, namely that proceeding from the lower end of the alimentary canal. It is this down-going breath, as it is termed in Vedic literature, which is the fertilizing element in various beliefs of creation through speech or breath. Similarly, analysis of the idea of the ear as a female receptive organ leads to the conclusion that this is a symbolic replacement, a "displacement from below upwards," of corresponding thoughts relating to the lower orifice of the alimentary canal. Putting these two conclusions together, we can hardly avoid the inference that the mythical legend in question represents a highly refined and disguised elaboration of the "infantile sexual theory"... according to which fecundation is supposed to be effected through the passage of intestinal gas from the Father to the Mother.” *ibid.*, 363.


31 In a passage in which he discusses the "autonomous activity of the psyche," Jung writes: "The psyche creates reality every day. The only expression that I can use for this is fantasy." C.G. Jung, *CW* 6 ¶ 78.

32 C.G. Jung, *CW* 10 ¶ 367, slightly modified.

33 Wolfgang Giegerich, "Comment on `The Autonomous Psyche'," *Spring 1985*, 172.

34 Giegerich, "Comment on `The Autonomous Psyche'," 172. Citation of Jung is to *CW* 14 ¶ 749.

35 Cf. "Psychology begins where any phenomenon (whether physical or mental, `real' or fantasy image) is interiorized absolute-negatively into itself, and I find myself in its internal infinity." Wolfgang Giegerich, "Is the Soul `Deep'? Entering and following the Logical Movement of Heraclitus' Fragment 45." *Spring 64* (1998): 31.

36 Giegerich, "Comment on `Autonomous Psyche'," 173.


38 C.G. Jung, *CW* 8 ¶ 964; *CW* 12 ¶ 20; *CW* 16 ¶ 497.


42 Paul Tillich, *Theology of Culture* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1959), 5. Tillich adds that if God is conceived of as a being "the question is quite justified whether such a thing does exist, and the answer equally justified that it does not exist."


Miller, *Three Faces of God*, 80, 137-150, 156.

